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Introduction
A computer virus is a program that propagates itself by injecting its own code into another program or file. As this host file is shared among friends, colleagues, and other individuals, the virus is carried along with it. When the file is executed or viewed, the virus code is executed as well and finds other host files within the new system. In this way, the virus itself has no direct control over its propagation.
A computer worm, on the other hand, is a self-contained program whose main purpose is to propagate (copy itself). The 'host' for a worm becomes an individual machine. However, unlike a virus, the worm has choice over how it propagates to other systems. Some worms take advantage of humans to facilitate propagation, through such simple tasks as reading e-mail, playing a downloaded game, and/or visiting a legitimate web site where a driveby download occurs. However, a worm may spread more rapidly, and thus will be more dangerous, if it exploits a vulnerability in the network or system it is attacking as a vehicle for replication. One recent real-world example of such a worm is the Conficker or Downadup, which hit the Internet in January of 2009. Conficker created a botnet which continues to be operational today and has resulted in millions of dollars of losses worldwide. In this manuscript, we focus our attention solely on worms and worm behavior and ignore viruses.
In general, a worm can be considered to contain two parts or main functions. These are: (1) the propagation mechanism used, and (2) a set of actions, usually referred to as "everything else." The propagation mechanism refers to the method used by the worm to infect vulnerable hosts. Examples of a worm's propagation mechanism include sending itself as an e-mail attachment to everyone on your contacts list or exploiting a vulnerability in a common filesharing program.
All of the other set of actions that a worm may take, commonly called the payload, is composed of everything the worm does besides propagate. Some worms will simply propagate and do not contain any payload. In other instances, worms have been found to perform Denial of Service (DoS) attacks against specific websites, install trojan on the infected system, and even un-install other worms, see http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v 100559.htm. We believe that these other actions may be further broken down into a self-preservation module and other goal-based actions (GBA) modules. Self-preservation could be as simple as disabling anti-virus software, adding itself to the host machine's startup scripts, and or making use of encryption mechanisms that hide its internal workings from those seeking to disable it. GBAs are included in the worm based upon the authors ordered set of goals.
As worms become more prolific, there becomes an obvious need for accurate and timely detection and prediction methods. Detection methods may be used to help mitigate an oncoming or ongoing attack. Predictive methods may be used to forecast how a theorized or recently discovered worm will act in the wild. They may also be used to calculate limits on what is possible for a worm to accomplish, which may be utilized in such a sector as Electronic Insur-ance. Known worms are detectable with today's signaturebased anti-Malware tools, however these methods are based upon knowing specifics of what the particular worm looks like, thus the need for updating worm libraries or databases whenever a new threat emerges. If one were to look not at what a particular worm's code is, but rather at the behavior of the program, then one would be able to detect "new" worms through their actions. We choose to focus on this behavioral-detection, specifically with respect to propagation from host-to-host within a localized network.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background material to help in understanding worm propagation and the previous work in this area. Section 3 describes our approach to testing the hypothesis, including initial problems encountered and the final directions taken. The design of a parameterized, algorithmic worm model is covered in Section 4. Simulations are described in Section 5, with testing, results and analysis in Section 6. A summary and final conclusions are given in Section 7.
Previous Work
As has been mentioned, a worm propagates by sending itself to a remote system and having that system execute its code. The methods for accomplishing this can be split into two broad categories, those which require user intervention and those which do not. Chat programs, textmessaging, e-mail, file-sharing programs such as BitTorrent and LimeWire are all examples of propagation which require user interaction. For file-sharing programs and e-mail, a human must download or view the file in order for the code to be executed on the system. Chat programs, Twitter, and social media networks such as MySpace and Facebook are similar, except that they tend to provide links to infected web pages, which cause code to be executed when viewed. The alternative method, not requiring user intervention, is for a worm to take advantage of a vulnerability present in a network protocol or a system itself, including the operating system. As they do not depend on human response, worms effecting this method are capable of spreading very quickly. However, this method also tends to be more difficult for worm authors. It requires intimate knowledge of the vulnerability, and the design of an exploit mechanism.
In this manuscript, we choose to focus on propagation methods which do not require user intervention, hence, providing an upper-bound on the propagation speed of a worm. Also, the modeling of non-interactive worms would be somewhat easier than interactive ones. This is because a model for an interactive worm would require attention to be focused on the sociological aspect of certain details, such as user-dependent wait times.
One major aspect which requires detail in modeling is how a worm finds the vulnerable hosts in a network. E-mail propagation worms use addresses found on the infected computer, while those that propagate through file-sharing programs use the inherent nature of those programs. Noninteractive worms, may choose to search for host names or IP addresses on the infected host, likely sub-optimal. This class of worms have two choices: either carry a hit-list of IP addresses, or use an algorithm to choose a set of addresses to scan. The hit-list approach is a more efficient method, as each iteration of the worm may divide a portion of its work among its children. However, this also brings with it many more bytes of data, and thus a larger footprint. Algorithm-based scanning leads to a more stealthy, smaller worm. Scanning methods fall into one of three categories: Sequential, Random, and Biased. The sequential scanning method selects the potential target host by sequentially scanning the address space of all hosts, starting at a pre-selected unique address. The random scanning method chooses any one of the available hosts with equal probability, 1/2 32 in the case of IPv4. The biased scanning method chooses a particular subnet or domain with higher probability. In practice, the biased method is a variant of random scanning, with a certain percentage of the scans being sent to addresses in the infected host's local subnet.
Worm propagation has previously been studied through three forms: modeling, simulation, and analysis of live events. Actual worm propagation is often difficult to analyze, as it requires a near-to-complete view of the Internet during the time of propagation and may suffer from interference of other worms [5] . Simulation suffers from the need to have a basic model with which to work, although does not require that model to be of a closed form. However, given the expansive nature of the Web and its associated complexity, accurate simulations are difficult. Recently, several authors [2] have introduced mixed-mode simulations as an effective tool to understand worm and virus propagations. In this approach, particular subnets are simulated in detail (at the packet level), while the Internet as a whole is simulated only from its aggregate behaviors. Specifically, hotspot subnets, where viruses are present and propagating at a rapid rate, are simulated in detail.
For these reasons, most researchers [5, 9, 8] in this area start by creating models with different levels of complexity before attempting simulation. This is then followed with an iterative process of: (1) validating the models through simulation, and (2) working in realistic scenarios that more accurately reflect the true nature of the Internet.
Unfortunately, both the models and simulations used in the past have had a number of weaknesses. Specifically, they do not take into account several important real-world parameters, such as network topology and bandwidth. This manuscript remedies these limitations by first using the well-known epidemic model in [5] as the basis for our research, while incorporating the real-world complexities of bandwidth limitations and taking into account the hetero-geneous nature of the Internet. That is, not all nodes are equally likely to be infected given a particular worm. Also, not all nodes run the same operating environment and set of applications. We then make changes to a chosen simulator for incorporating our model and a more realistic worm algorithm.
Related Work
In recent years several attempts have been made to model the propagation behavior of worms and viruses. The basic approach, as introduced by Staniford and Paxson et. al. [5] , describes the propagation behavior in terms of a simple epidemic model. Equations 1 and 2 describe the change in number of susceptible and infected hosts, respectively, over time. In these equations, β is the infection rate for a single worm.
In order to arrive at this model, Staniford and Paxson made the following assumptions about topology and lifetimes:
• All hosts are equally likely to infect any of the other hosts that have not been infected thus far;
• Infection rate model ignores the presence of firewalls, network address translation (NAT), and other forms of trust or protection; and
• No countermeasures are taken, thus once a system is infected, it remains infected.
The Spatial Epidemic model [2] attempts to address the topology and countermeasures problems with the Simple Epidemic model. Spatial Epidemic follows the susceptibleinfected-removed (SIR) pattern, whereby a host is in one of those three states and transitions from susceptible to infected and from infected to removed, as shown here in Equations 3 and 4:
In Equations 3 and 4, γ represents the removal rate of worms as caused by patching or quarantining. Here, r(t) represents the population so far removed, patched, or quarantined. It also takes into account groupings by modeling different infection rates between and within groups. In the traditional biological sense, this is analogous to different infection rates within and between countries or provinces. In a network sense, this is a simplistic partitioning into subnets or domains.
Subsequently, Zou et. al. [9] studied the standard epidemic model with random scanning. In their work, they showed that the simple epidemic model holds for a population of uniformly distributed hosts and a worm that applies a divide-and-conquer scanning algorithm, where a worm splits its IP scanning space among its children. In addition, Zou et. al. showed that for all considerations of uniformly distributed hosts, the models converge to the standard epidemic model. Finally, in their research they considered a local-preference scanning technique with the assumption that vulnerable hosts are not uniformly distributed. In this latter case, no closed analytical solution was possible. Nevertheless, using the "law of large numbers", they rationalize that averages over the entire population will lead back to the original epidemic model. Tom Vogt, see http://web.lemuria.org/security/WormPropagation.pdf focused on simulation based on the original epidemic model, however provided suggestions for a more expanded study. In his paper, he suggests that network structure and topology has an impact on real propagations. He also calculates the bandwidth consumed by a particular worm spreading in his models. However, he does not consider this bandwidth calculation as a constraint in his model or simulations.
Approach
The stated hypothesis of this paper is that real-world constraints, such as bandwidth and heterogeneity of hosts, greatly affect the propagation of worms. This work first attempted to address the claim by making changes to the mathematical models used in previous research. After problems were encountered, a new direction was taken, focusing on creating a generalized algorithmic worm model. This model was then coded into a network simulator, www.ssfnet.org, for testing and analysis.
As mentioned, the first attempt to address the above claim was to try and work bandwidth and topology considerations into the classic epidemic model used by other researchers [5, 9, 8] .
In the Simple Epidemic model, it is assumed that all hosts are universally connected, and thus the probability of any infected host contacting and infecting another host is:
where η is the number of scans an infected host sends per unit time, η * δ is the number of scans an infected host will send in time δ, and Ω is the total number of hosts including susceptible and non-susceptible. This follows from:
and the product of time slots 0 through η * δ.
We proposed an extension to the Simple Epidemic model that adjusts for bandwidth considerations and non-uniform infection probabilities. Whereby:
and the simple probability, p, is refined for group-to-group and host-to-host interactions, in the form of p ij . We made note that although it is ideal to find a closed-form solution for these equations, it is not necessary to gain necessary insights through simulation. We chose to focus on two different changes to the models. The first dealt with the infection rate, β, between different hosts and subnets. We believed that this scanning rate would clearly be limited by bandwidth constraints, at both a host level and with the aggregate outgoing scans for a LAN. The second proposed change concerned the probability of one host infecting another. In the classic equations, it is assumed that this probability is uniform. However, we note that due to such mitigations as firewall mechanisms, not all hosts equally trust one another. An example of this would be a user connecting to a corporate network using a VPN client. While certain traffic may be normally blocked by the corporate network's firewall, the user's host effectively becomes a hole through which a virus may enter if that user's host itself becomes infected.
To adequately test such changes to the model, real-world data of bandwidth constraints and hosts' software needed to be gathered; specifically, in support of these questions:
1. What is the range and average up-link bandwidth for hosts on the Internet?
2. What is the percentage and connectivity of hosts on the Internet that have certain operating systems and server software installed?
Network research mailing-lists, individuals, and companies were contacted in seeking this information, but with little results. Responses from individuals and the mailing lists included no direct knowledge of this information, however provided pointers to organizations such as IANA, ICANN, NLANR, and CAIDA. Of these, only NLANR and CAIDA seemed to be collecting network information, but did not provide the necessary bandwidth statistics. Telegeography, a company which creates and sells reports of Internet statistics, responded to our inquiries with a statement that they do not collect inter-network link bandwidths and do not know of anyone else who does. For operating system usage, The Gartner Group and the Network Operations of WPI were contacted. While there are a few particular instances of some operating system and software usage statistics on-line, often their breadth, and sometimes accuracy, are lacking.
These problems, coupled with the mathematical difficulties of forming a complete and closed model, led to a reassessment of the claim put forth and approach to be taken toward it. During this reassessment, a few realizations were made concerning the state of current worm research. First, it became obvious that most, if not all, of the research on worm propagation had been concerning the effects of worms on the Internet as a whole and not on particular segments of subnets. Secondly, there is a lack of tools available to test new worm actions and propagation routines without releasing them to the wild or in a completely controlled, small-scale, setting. To address both of these issues in the scope of the original hypothesis, a new approach was chosen that considered creating a parameterized, algorithmic worm model and a worm simulation tool capable of simulating a campus-sized network and its interactions with the Internet as a whole.
Worm Design
By definition, a worm is a self-contained, self propagating program. Thus, in simple terms, it has two main functions: that which propagates and that which does "other" things. We propose that there is a third broad functionality of a worm, that of self-preservation. We also propose that the "other" functionality of a worm may be more appropriately categorized as Goal-Based Actions (GBA), as whatever functionality included in a worm will naturally be dependent on whatever goals (and subgoals) the author has.
In thius work we extended the work by Weaver et. al. in [6] which laid out the foundation of a taxonomy of computer worms. We extend this work by adding a selfpreservation module and a Goal-Based action model as described below.
Self Preservation: The Self Preservation actions of a worm may take many forms. In the wild, worms have been observed to disable anti-virus software or prevent sending itself to certain antivirus-known addresses. They have also been seen to attempt disabling of other worms which may be contending for the same system. We also believe that a time-based throttled scanning may help the worm to "slip under the radar". We also propose a decoy method, whereby a worm will release a few children that "cause a lot of noise" so that the parent is not noticed. It has also been proposed [6] that a worm cause damage to its host if, and only if, it is "disturbed" in some way. This module could contain parameters for: probability of success in disabling antivirus or other software updates, probability of being noticed and thus removed, or "hardening" of the host against other worms.
Goal-Based Actions: A worm's GBA functionality depends on the author's goal list. The Payloads section of [6] provides some useful suggestions for such a module. The opening of a back-door can make the host susceptible to more attacks. This would involve a probability of the back-door being used and any associated traffic utilization. It could also provide a list of other worms this host is now susceptible to or a list of vulnerabilities this host now has. Spam relays and HTTP-Proxies of course have an associated bandwidth consumption or traffic pattern. Internet DoS attacks would have a set time of activation, a target, and a traffic pattern. Data damage would have an associated probability that the host dies because of the damage.
Implementation
In order to test our hypothesis, that bandwidth and heterogeneity of hosts affect worm propagation, a networkbased simulator was sought that would allow effective and easy incorporation of our algorithmic model. The reason for choosing a network-based simulator is based on our need for detailed behavioral observation. Specifically packetlevel, to show worm traffic effects with network-based constraints.
As part of this work different simulators were considered, amongst which the ns2 network simulator, http://www.isi.edu/nsnam/ns/, the Network Worm Simulator (NWS), http://www.users.qwest.net/ eballen1/nws/, and finally the Scalable Simulation Framework (SSFNet). SSFNet is a packet-level simulator, much like ns2, written in Java and utilizes a Domain Modeling Language (DML) specifically developed for writing simulations in SSFNet. Michael Liljenstam created a worm framework (SSF.App.Worm within the SSFNet simulator. For this reason, the SSFNet simulator was chosen.
Framework
A framework was constructed that incorporates the algorithmic model of Section 4 into the SSFNet simulator.
Similar to the ideas of [3] , there needed to be an Internetlevel module which keeps track of the worm spreading throughout the Internet as a whole. This is on a very high level, being simply equation-based and not packet-based. The abstraction is both necessary, for scalability, and reasonable. It has been shown [5, 8, 3 ] that epidemic models can be created to model the spread of worms on such a high level.
The next two key components are on the LAN-level of simulation: Hosts and Gateways. A Gateway is simply the gateway router that provides the up-link from the LAN to the Internet. Hosts are individual hosts within a LAN that are made up of multiple components themselves. Hosts have a particular operating system version installed and are of a single architecture (such as x86 or alpha). They also run particular software which may provide network services, such as web (HTTP) or Emil (SMTP).
The third key component is the Worm itself, which builds on the algorithmic model of Section 4 and thus described in brief here. The three parts of a Worm are the propagation mechanism, the Goal-Based Actions (GBAs), and selfpreservation techniques. The propagation is broken down into targeting and infecting, with an optional scanning in between. Targeting is the method by which the worm chooses an IP address of its next target. Infecting is the sending of the actual infection vector (IV). Scanning may be anything from a simple ping-check of the host to a full vulnerability check. GBAs are actions based on the goals of the worm author, such as installing a spam relay or DoS attack. Self-preservation techniques may involve such things as delaying a worm's infection rate to make it more stealthy or disabling anti-virus software on the infected host.
Many changes needed to be made to the simulator to incorporate this designed framework, the most important of which was the translation between Internet level equations and packet level LANs. Specifics of these changes may be found in Appendix B of [1] .
Testing, Results and Analysis
All of the following simulations were run multiple (10) times, with the data from each then averaged and shown below. The reason for multiple runs of the same simulation was to produce an average behavior for analysis, rather than dealing with statistical aberrations from analyzing a single run. We also wished to have a certain degree of confidence to guarantee that our ten runs were sufficient.
A simple confidence metric to use when sampling data is to test if most values fall within two standard deviations (2 * σ) of the mean. To accomplish this, we must compute the sample variance:
where σ is the standard deviation, x i is the i th sample value, x mean is the mean over all x i 's, and n is the number of samples. We must then compute the averages and confidence factors (2 * σ) for both the times to infections in the LAN and the rate of infection 1 . These averages and confidence factors may be found in Tables 1 and 2 . All data values fell within the confidence interval (mean +/-2 * σ), which led us to reason that the ten runs of each simulation were sufficient to analyze their aggregate, average behavior and perform meaningful analysis.
It is important to note that in order to obtain varying simulation results, the PRNG seed value specified in the DML configuration file was changed for each run, thus producing different sequences of random numbers.
The worm chosen to simulate was SQL Slammer [4] . This worm was of interest to us for two reasons. It propagated so quickly and caused so much network traffic that it utilized the entire up-link bandwidth of many LANs. In addition, Slammer has only a propagation method, no GBAs. Slammer propagation method consisted solely of choosing a target IP address and sending a single, 376 byte UDP packet to that target. This simplicity made coding of the worm in 
Establishing a baseline
The first step required in testing a hypothesis is to create a baseline with which to compare results. This often involves re producing prior research tests and then running variations on those tests. Since this work both built heavily off of the SSF.App.Worm simulations and introduces a new extension, the first step was to run the chosen worm, Slammer, with the original SSF.App.Worm code and then with the newly introduced code.
Since the original SSF.App.Worm code iterates over the epidemic model equations, it required the epidemic parameters take on those values associated with the Slammer worm [7] , as specified in Table 3 . s 0 is the number of initially susceptible hosts in the Internet, i 0 the number of initially infected hosts in the Internet, and β the infection rate. The LAN topology used is based on the WPI campus network and more fully explained in [1] . The results from this simulation are shown in Figure 1 as the original code data line. The first infection within the LAN occurs at 204 seconds, with the last at 249 seconds. Table 3 . Slammer epidemic parameter settings.
Parameter Value
The new SSF.App.Worm code, which includes the worm framework as described in Section 5, both utilizes the original iterative mechanism and introduces new parameters. The original mechanism is used for the global infection rate, while the new parameters are specific to the LAN being simulated at the packet level. Important parameters introduced are: up-link capacity, number in LAN susceptible, number in LAN initially infected, and scanning strategy. In creating a base-case, these parameters for the LAN were set as detailed in the first row of Table 4 . The results from this simulation are shown in Figure 1 Figure 1 . First, once the initial infection occurs within the LAN, the rate of propagation between original code and new code is similar. Second, the first infection within the LAN occurs sooner with the new code than with the original code. We believe this difference of initial infection time to be due to the differing methods in which the new code and the original code calculate when a susceptible host becomes infected. The original code infects the LAN susceptible hosts using solely the mathematical epidemic equations. For each time step, it calculates how many new global infections there were since the last time step. Then, with probability based on the number of LAN susceptible hosts versus the number of globally susceptible hosts, one of the LAN susceptible hosts is chosen to become infected. Mathematically, this is equivalent to:
where i ttl is the total number of global infections at time t, i old is the total number of global infections at time t − 1, s net is the number of susceptible in the LAN at time t, and s global is the number of susceptible in the Internet at time t.
Our new code infects the LAN susceptible hosts using a combination of the epidemic equations and sending of simulated scan packets on the network. We assume that the number of scans created at a time, t, is based on the number of infected hosts at that time. The probability that a LAN susceptible host becomes infected is based on the total number of new scans created globally, the probability that those scans are sent to the LAN, and the probability that those scans sent to the LAN will reach a susceptible host. Mathematically, this is equivalent to:
(10) where i ttl and s net are as in Equation 9, 2 32 is the total IP space for IPv4, β is the infection rate as described in the standard epidemic model, and lan space is the total IP space for the LAN.
To
and arrive at
As may be seen, the probability of infecting a susceptible host within the LAN is slightly greater for the new code. It should be understood that the calculation of the number of scans to send causes those scans to be created at the network level and sent across the 30ms link to the LAN. This small up-link delay causes a host to become infected almost instantaneously when its IP address has been selected for a scan packet. We believe that this difference between Equations 9 and 10 may be due to the time step involved, and would be further tested by decreasing the resolution of the time step from one second to a value on scale with the LAN's up-link delay. We note, however, that it is apparent in Figure 1 that the rate of infection is not affected by this discrepancy, and thus we may gain insights through analysis of test results with the new code.
Parameter variations

ID Up-link capacity LAN Susceptible Scan Strategy
Feedback ?  1  45Mb  10  random  No  2  45Mb  20  random  No  3  45Mb  5  random  No  4  15Mb  10  random  No  5  15Mb  10  random  Yes  6  5Mb  10  random  Yes  7  45Mb Table 4 . Simulation parameter settings Table 4 describes the main parameter variations between each simulation run in this section. The ID is simply an identifier for that run, such as referring to ID = 1 as the first simulation and ID = 4 as the fourth simulation. Up-link capacity is the capacity of the LAN's sole link to the Internet, across which all Internet-to-LAN and LANto-Internet scans must traverse. LAN Susceptible is the number of susceptible hosts in the LAN. Scan Strategy is the target acquisition method used by the worm. Feedback is whether or not the simulation incorporates a feedback mechanism, further described below. All simulations were run with no initial infections in the LAN, thus the first LAN infection occurs due to an incoming Internet-to-LAN scan, as is normally the case but for the LAN where the worm is released.
We believed that each of these parameters would show effects as predicted by our hypothesis. In particular, we reasoned that the up-link capacity for a LAN should throttle the propagation of a worm within that LAN. Differing the number of susceptible hosts in the LAN allowed us to test the hypothesis that the number of hosts affects the observed rate of infection. Differing the scanning strategy was also believed to show how a worm's simple epidemic parameters were not adequate to describe localized, corporate LAN scale, propagation. The feedback mechanism was worked into the mix in order to further show how bandwidth constraints can affect not only the localized propagation, but the global as well.
The first set of variations were aimed at testing a change in the number of susceptible in the LAN. These simulations were equivalent to an increase of twice as many susceptible and a decrease to half as many susceptible. Figure 2 shows the number of infections in the LAN over time, comparing these simulations with the base-case (ID = 1). As can be seen, the initial infection occurs sooner for the simulation with 20 susceptible and later for the simulation with 5 susceptible. This follows logically, as the probability that one host will be chosen in a single scan is one over the total IP space, or 1/2 32 . Thus with 20, 10, and 5 susceptible, the chance that one of the susceptible will be chosen to infect is 20/2 32 , 10/2 32 , and 5/2 32 , respectively. Similar reasoning may be made for the tail of the curves. The number infected at t = 150 is approximately half the base-case with half the number of susceptible, and approximately twice the basecase with twice the number of susceptible. While we admit that these results are entirely expected, they help to verify appropriate behavior of the simulator.
The next set of variations, simulations four through six, were run to show the effects of a throttled bandwidth on the worm's scan traffic and infection rate. Figure 3 shows the outgoing scan rate from the LAN for each of these simulations, plus the base-line. The important thing to note here is that the steady-state reached by the outgoing scans should be equivalent in all cases, as the total number of worm infections is the same. However, as can be seen, the baseline (with a 45Mbps up-link) has approximately a threetimes greater steady state than the 15Mbps case, and that the 15Mbps case has approximately a three-times greater steady state than the 5Mbps case. This shows that there is truly throttling of outgoing scans due to the up-link capacity. Why this is important will become clear shortly. We now introduce the concept of a feedback mechanism into the simulations. By feedback, we mean that the outgoing scan-rate from the LAN should affect the global propaga- This mechanism was developed and encoded into the simulator in part to test the claim that bandwidth constraints should be considered when constructing worm propagation models. A major assumption of this feedback method is that the proportion of successfully outgoing scans is the same across all LANs. While this may not provide exactly correct proportions, it is a reasonable abstraction to make in order to show that there is indeed necessity to create worm propagation models with bandwidth constraint considerations. As we hypothesized, the global infection rate and LAN infection rate do indeed change when the feedback mechanism is introduced, shown in Figures 4 and 5 , respectively. As may be seen for both the Internet and the LAN, infection rate is effectively slowed, so that 100% infection takes more time.
The final set of simulations were concerned with varying the scanning strategy of the worm. While Slammer itself used only a random target acquisition method, we thought it appropriate to see how a change to a locally-biased strategy would affect the propagation of the worm.
The first simulation run was that of a simple 50%, 8-bit local bias, with parameters set according to row six of Table 4. As can be seen in Figure 8 , as soon as the first host becomes infected within the LAN, all of the other susceptible are nearly immediately infected. This is because half of the scans for that infection are now being sent to the 255 hosts within its class C address space, which all of the other susceptible are in.
After seeing these results, we were curious to know what would happen when the susceptible population is broken up, as is the case in a realistic LAN topology. We then separated ten susceptible hosts from the initial class C subnet, placed them in a different subnet within the LAN, and re-ran the simulations. Since the susceptible hosts were now spread across the campus, we also felt it appropriate to see what would happen when we changed the idea of locality from class C address space to a class B address space (a 16-bit mask on the infected host's IP address). Results from these simulation are displayed in Figure 6 . We can see that the ; as soon as the first host is infected, all susceptible hosts in its proximity are immediately infected. However, it takes some time before the next set of hosts become infected. While still allowing the worm to propagate faster in the LAN, we believe this disconnect provides an opportunity for mitigation. There will naturally be an unusual traffic pattern produced by the worm, which may be noticed within the initial subnet and cause blocking of the worm or that service across the entire LAN, thus preventing the remaining susceptible hosts from becoming infected. This may particularly be useful when utilizing honeynets. Another question arose from these local-bias simulations, that of how the proposed feedback mechanism would affect the propagation. After enabling the feedback mechanism and re-running the simulations, Figure 7 was formed. In this graph, we see the global infection of the worm. There are four plots: (a) a 15Mb up-link capacity and no feedback mechanism, (b) a 15Mb up-link capacity with feedback, (c) a 15Mb uplink capacity with feedback and a locally-biased worm, and (d) 5Mb up-link capacity with feedback. All plots follow the traditional S-curve, as defined by the epidemic model. However, variations are seen in between when there is a small percentage of infected hosts and when the maximum is reached. The similarities between the plots, for the ini- tial and maximal infection, may be easily explained. The feedback mechanism, which effectively only adjusts β in the epidemic model, does not take effect until there is throttling of outgoing scans in the local LAN. Since the first infection occurs around t = 100, then the feedback will not start to affect the infection rate until this time, as seen in the graph. Each plot then eventually reaches the 100% mark and stays there. As there are no removals occuring in the system, this is the natural steady-state that all infections are expected to reach, as seen in the graph. As expected, the feedback mechanism causes the global infection rate to slow down from plot (a) to (b). There is a slight slow-down even further, from plot (b) to (c). Since the change is to a locally-biased worm, it can be assumed that the quicker local infection rate, as shown in Figure 8 , causes the up-link to be saturated sooner. This then causes the feedback mechanism to take effect sooner, thus showing a slightly slower propagation rate. When the up-link capacity is shrunk even further, to 5Mbps in plot (d), the up-link is saturated even sooner, thus causing the slower infection rate. 
Conclusions and Future Work
Our goal was to test the claim that real-world parameters, such as up-link capacity, topology, and worm scanning strategy, do affect both the propagation of worms within a LAN and their effects on that LAN. Problems were identified for the worm research community, with respect to lack of data and appropriate tools. An algorithmic worm model was developed, specifically proposing the concept of Goal-Based Actions (GBAs) that affect the combination of various worm functions. A simulation framework was developed 2 to allow for testing of different parameters of the worm algorithm. This simulation framework was then used to test the proposed hypothesis. Variations of up-link bandwidth and scanning strategy showed that there is an impact 2 The framework will be open available for researchers through the Wireless System Security Research Lab, http://www.wssrl.org/ on the local network and the rate of outgoing scans. A feedback mechanism was introduced to allow changes in the LAN outgoing scan rate to affect the global infection rate. This feedback showed that both the global and local propagation are affected by bandwidth constraints. We believe these results present reasonable justification for the hypothesis.
